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Abstract: While the matching function relates hirings (H) to vacancies (V) and 
unemployment, the duration function relates the average duration of vacancies as 
measured by V/H to unemployment. Shifts of the duration function are equivalent to 
shifts of the matching function but easier to interpret. Therefore, this paper focuses on 
the microfoundations of the duration function. We find, first, that outward shifts of 
the duration function, or, equivalently, longer recruitment times at given 
unemployment, have no direct effects on hirings. Second, the effect of longer 
recruitment times on hirings through higher recruitment costs depends on the relative 
importance of vacancy costs in total recruitment costs, where vacancy costs include 
the opportunity cost of unfilled jobs. Third, this paper reports information on unfilled 
jobs (unmet demand) as distinct from job vacancies (recruitment processes) according 
to a new business survey in Sweden.    
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1. Introduction 
The matching function is a relation between hirings, job vacancies and unemployment 
which summarizes the effect of friction in job matching. The relation has been 
interpreted and estimated as a (Cobb-Douglas) production function, with stocks of 
vacancies and unemployment as inputs and the number of hirings per period as 
output, first by Pissarides (1986), Blanchard and Diamond (1989), and Layard, Nickel 
and Jackman (1991), and then by many others, as the comprehensive survey by 
Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) shows.  
  A shift of the matching function with less hirings at given inputs of vacancies 
and unemployment suggests a change of the matching technology which reduces the 
number of hirings per period. But exactly what are the effects of a shift of the 
matching function on hirings and employment and how can they be estimated? 
  To investigate this problem we shall here use a function which contains the 
same information as the matching function but which turns out to be easier to 
interpret and analyse, namely the duration function. This is a function which uses the 
same variables as the matching function, namely hirings (H), vacancies (V), and 
unemployment, but in a different order. More precisely, the duration function relates 
the average duration of vacancies as measured by V/H to the unemployment rate (and 
other variables characterizing the state of the labour market). 
  A shift of the matching function is equivalent to a shift of the duration function. 
An outward shift of the duration function is equivalent to longer recruitment times at 
a given unemployment rate. Thus, we shall focus on the effects of longer recruitment 
times on hirings. 
  Section 2 reports some stylized facts about recruitment times, but also about 
some other aspects of friction, especially unmet labour demand. 
  In Section 3 we analyse the effect of longer recruitment times on a 
representative firm’s hirings in equilibrium. We do this by extending the model in 
Pissarides (2000) to include price formation and all recruitment costs. We find that 
longer recruitment times reduce hirings only if they also raise recruitment costs. This 
means that effects on hirings of longer recruitment crucially depends on the structure 
of recruitment costs, more precisely the relative importance of vacancy costs in total 
recruitment costs.   2
  In Section 4 we review the Beveridge curve and the matching function and see 
how indirect evidence on vacancy durations from these functions can be replaced by 
direct evidence from the duration function. We also find that a shift of the matching 
function or, equivalently, a shift of the duration function, has no direct effect on 
hirings. Longer recruitment times affect hirings only indirectly, for instance, through 
higher recruitment costs or more unfilled jobs. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Facts about friction 
Purchases of goods or services in a market economy are generated by decisions to 
purchase, followed by search processes which, in general, are costly and time-
consuming. This also applies to the labour market. Thus, hirings are generated by 
firms’ recruitment decisions. Some of these decisions are followed (almost) 
instantaneously by hirings. Other recruitment decisions are followed by recruitment 
processes which end by hirings after waiting times which often are random and 
sometimes long. They sometimes also involve ‘unsatisfied labour demand’. And some 
recruitment processes may end without hirings. In this section we review some 
stylized facts about all of these aspects of friction in the hiring process. 
 
2.1. Hirings without job vacancies 
Some hirings are made more or less directly, for example, by recalling workers 
previously laid off, or by offering jobs to spontaneous job applicants. In such cases a 
firm's recruitment activities are merely some phone calls or letters, or (answers to) 
direct questions. Then recruitment times are negligible and hirings are not preceded 
by job vacancies as measured in vacancy surveys. Information on such instantaneous 
hirings is scarce. But what information there is does suggest that not every hiring 
begins with time-consuming recruitment.  
  Consider, for instance, the Employment Opportunity Pilot Project (EOPP) 
surveys in the United States in 1980 and 1982.
1 In these surveys employers were 
asked questions about the hiring process for the most recent newly hired person. In 
the first survey the first question asked concerned the length of time between the time 
recruitment started and the time the individual started to work. Twenty-eight per cent   3
responded that they did not recruit for the position, suggesting that a third of the hires 
were instantaneous. 
 
2.2. Job vacancies and recruitment times 
Hirings which are not instantaneous arise when there is no existing pool of job 
applicants which a firm can turn to. In this case the firm has to attract new job 
applicants by advertising its demand for personnel in newspapers or other media, by 
placing job orders with a public or private employment agency, or by contacting 
potential candidates directly. Then vacancies understood as ‘recruitment processes’ 
arise, as discussed in, e.g., Burdett and Cunningham (1998). 
  More precisely, a job vacancy begins when a firm starts to recruit a worker and 
it ends when a worker offered the job accepts it (or when recruiting is discontinued 
for other reasons). This is also the usual definition in vacancy surveys, including all 
the surveys discussed in NBER (1966), Muysken (1994), and Verhage et al. (1997). 
  The average duration of recruitment times, as measured by V/H, is usually under 
a month. This is confirmed by data in Table 1 from a new vacancy survey in Sweden.    
 
2.3. Job vacancies and unfilled jobs 
As emphasized by Holt and David (1966 p. 82), firms create vacancies (recruitment 
processes) in anticipation of future needs. But a firm does not always succeed in 
hiring a new worker in time to replace a separation or begin an expansion according 
to plan, and then an ‘unfilled job’ exists from the day the employer wants the worker 
to start to the day the worker starts. Measurement of ‘unfilled jobs’ in this sense gives 
information on ‘unsatisfied labour demand’ as defined in the classical literature on 
vacancies, including Dow and Dicks-Mireaux (1958) and Hansen (1970). 
  Thus, unfortunately, ‘vacancies’ is an ambiguous term.  It sometimes means 
‘recruitment processes’ and sometimes ‘unmet labour demand’, both in the economics 
literature and in everyday language. This is particularly unfortunate since firms create 
‘vacancies’ in one sense (recruitment processes) in order to avoid ‘vacancies’ in 
another sense (unmet demand). When necessary to emphasize this distinction, 
vacancies as recruitment processes (that is, job vacancies as defined in Section 2.2)  
                                                                                                                                            
1 Results from the first wave are reported in Barron, Bishop and Dunkelberg (1985) and results from   4
 
Table 1   Job openings, unfilled jobs, and average recruitment times in Sweden. 





















2000 Q3  2550  88.4  69.2  2.7  0.81  1.1 
         Q4  2493  72.2  63.1  2.6  1.05  1.1 
2001 Q1  2504  70.3  57.9  2.3  0.93  1.0 
         Q2  2538  91.8  49.4  2.0  0.58  0.8 
         Q3  2647  83.2  44.7  1.7  0.55  0.7 
         Q4  2574  65.1  38.8  1.5  0.65  0.6 
2002 Q1  2522  61.4  38.4  1.6  0.64  0.6 
         Q2  2573  97.7  39.1  1.6  0.40  0.6 
         Q3  2575  84.1  35.2  1.4  0.43  0.6 
 
Notes: See Farm (2003) for operational definitions of job openings and unfilled jobs. Columns 5 and 7 
report job openings and unfilled jobs as per cent of employment. Column 6 reports estimates of V/H 
(not estimates in column 4 divided by estimates in column 3). Standard deviations are approximately 
0.05 in columns 5 and 7 and approximately 0.03 in column 6. Since 2000 Q3, when unemployment 
was 4.7 %, unemployment has fluctuated around 4.0 % (between 3.8 % and 4.2 %).   
 
Source: Statistics Sweden (business surveys). See SCB (2002a) and SCB (2002b) for examples of 
reports from the quarterly surveys. 
 
may perhaps be called job openings, while vacancies as unmet demand may be called 
unfilled jobs. 
  Surveys on unmet labour demand are so far in short supply but now include, for 
instance, the new vacancy surveys in the US and Sweden.
2 According to these 
surveys the rate of unfilled jobs in the private sector in 2001 was (on average) 2.9 per 
cent in the US and 0.8 per cent in Sweden. According to the Swedish survey, which 
measures both job openings (recruitment processes) and unfilled jobs (unmet 
demand), the rate of job openings was 1.9 per cent in 2001, which shows that the 
distinction between job openings and unfilled jobs cannot be ignored.  
 
2.4. Job vacancies without hirings 
Job vacancies can be cancelled by firms before hiring. This can happen simply 
because the situation has changed, so that the firms no longer want to recruit new 
                                                                                                                                            
the second wave in Barron and Bishop (1985). 
2 See http://stats.bls.gov for monthly data since the end of 2000 from the Job Openings and Labor 
Turnover Survey (JOLTS) in the US and Table 1 for quarterly data from the Swedish survey since the 
end of 2000. Note that unfilled jobs are called ‘job openings’ in JOLTS, which measures unmet 
demand but not recruitment processes.   5
personnel, or because firms having difficulties in forecasting their labour demand 
realize that they have exaggerated their needs.
3 Or some job vacancies may be 
cancelled because firms realize that no recruitment is possible at the moment and have 
to solve their staffing problems by other means, for instance reorganization followed 
by posting vacancies which are easier to fill.  
  Information on cancelled job vacancies is rare, but some sample surveys by the 
Public Employment Service in Sweden in the beginning of the 1990’s suggest that the 
proportion of vacancies which end in hiring is very high, and at least equal to 90 per 
cent.
4 Results by van Ours and Ridder (1992 p. 145) suggest the same thing. Thus, it 
seems to be approximately true that all vacancies (sooner or later) end in hiring, 
which is a standard assumption in the search literature, including Mortensen and 
Pissarides (1999).  
 
3. Hirings, vacancies, and employment in equilibrium 
In equilibrium with recruitment costs a firm's flow of profits is  
(1)   π α γ = − − − R N wN H V () ,  
where R denotes the firm’s (net) revenue function, N its employment, H its number of 
hirings per period, and V its number of job vacancies. The wage level is denoted by w 
and recruitment costs are captured by the parameters α, as in Nickell (1986), and γ , 
as in Pissarides (1990). For simplicity we ignore firing costs. 
  Note that recruitment costs in general are composed of both ‘fixed’ costs (α  per 
hiring) and ‘variable’ costs (γ per vacancy and period). Fixed recruitment costs are 
independent of the length of the recruitment process. Suppose, for example, that a 
firm finds it necessary to announce a position in a newspaper. If this is done only 
once, or a predetermined number of times, it is a fixed cost or, in other words, a hiring 
cost. Then it is part of α. If, on the other hand, the firm advertises once a week until 
the vacancy is filled, then the cost is variable (dependent on the length of the 
recruitment process) and thus part of the vacancy cost γ . The same is true if the firm 
is using a private employment agency and is paying the agency for its services per 
week. But if the agency is paid per job match, then the cost is a hiring cost and thus 
                                                 
3 As emphasized, for instance, by Thomson (1966 p. 177). 
4 See Falk (1996).   6
part of α. We incorporate both hiring costs α  and vacancy costs γ  in the model 







  Next we assume that the flow of a firm’s hirings is proportional to its 
recruitment efforts as measured by its stock of vacancies, 
(2)   H qV = . 
Thus, in contrast to Nickel (1986), where all hirings are instantaneous, we assume 
here that a firm has to generate vacancies to obtain new employees, so that no hirings 
are instantaneous, as in Pissarides (2000). 
  The constant of proportionality q in (2) can be interpreted as the probability 
per week that one of the V vacancies leads to a hiring, so that the waiting time has an 
exponential distribution with expected value equal to 1  weeks. Of course, in a 
stochastic environment such a direct link between the stock of vacancies and the flow 
of hirings as in (2) can only apply to a large firm exploiting the law of large numbers, 
as emphasized by Pissarides (2000 p. 68), or to a large group of (small) firms. In 
general q depends on the state of the labour market, but we postpone discussion of 
this dependence to Section 4. 
q
 
3.1. Profit maximization with recruitment costs  
We assume (for simplicity) that a firm's separations are given by sN , where the 
separation rate s is constant. Then we have  sN =  in a steady state and substituting 
this expression and VH  into (1) we obtain  qs N q ==
(3)   =− + RN w N qs N bg g .  γ
  Now we use the simple economic principles in Nickel (1986 p. 481) and argue 
as follows. According to (3) a unit increase in employment generates additional costs 
of  ++ αγ b  per period in equilibrium. But in order to obtain a new employee 
the firm also has to generate a vacancy for 1  weeks (on the average). A unit 
increase in employment consequently also involves a once for all cost of α γ + q, or, 
equivalently, a flow cost of r  per period, where r is the interest rate. It 
follows that 
q g αγ + b
q s g
(4)   ′ =++ + RN w r s q () ( ) αγ bg    7
in equilibrium for a profit-maximizing firm. Note that (4) reduces to the job creation 
condition in Pissarides (2000) for a competitive firm with constant returns and  0 α = . 
 
3.2. Employment and price formation 
As emphasized by Layard, Nickel, and Jackman (1991 p. 341) for a non-competitive 
firm without recruitment costs, equation (4) is an equilibrium relationship: ‘It is not a 
labour demand function because prices are chosen jointly with employment’. This is 
also true for a representative competitive firm. For withRN p FN b g b g = , where F 
denotes the production function and p the market price, condition (4) reduces to 
(5)   pF N w r s q ′ =++ + bg b g b g αγ , 
and assuming that the firm is one of n identical firms in a competitive industry, the 
market price and a firm’s employment are determined by equation (5) and the 
equation 
(6)   nF N D p b g b g = , 
where   is the industry’s product-demand function.  D ⋅ bg
  Pissarides (2000) assumes that the marginal product of labour is constant. But 
then it is particularly clear that equation (5) can be interpreted not only as a job 
creation condition, as in Pissarides (2000), but also as a price equation. For if 
 equation (5) can be written as  ′ = FN a b g
(7)   pw a r s q a w =+ + + 1 bg b g αγ . 
  As emphasized by Pissarides elsewhere, in Pissarides (1984 p. 133), an equation 
like (5) with   is basically a modification of the classical condition on 
wages under constant returns to scale. The marginal product of labour (a) exceeds the 
real wage (
′ = FN a b g
wp ) because firms need to cover their recruitment costs. And in 
equilibrium in a competitive economy prices adjust to marginal costs, including 
recruitment costs. 
  A change in wages will change market prices, sales, and employment. 
Assuming that the effect of a change in wages has a well-defined effect on 
employment, there is a well-defined wage elasticity of labour demand. It follows from 
(5) and (6) that the effects of recruitment costs on employment depend on this wage 
elasticity of labour demand and the relative importance of recruitment costs in total 
labour costs.   8
   Moreover, according to equation (5) the effect of a change in the average 
duration of vacancies (1 ) on employment depends on how important vacancy costs 
(
q
γ ) are relative to hiring costs (α ). And if q depends on the state of the labour 
market, then variations in the state of the labour market have effects on employment 
through their effects on the average duration of vacancies. 
 
3.3. Vacancy costs 
The structure of recruitment costs for time-consuming recruitment depends on the 
search strategy used by firms. This question has been addressed by, for instance, van 
Ours and Ridder (1992). Using vacancy data from the Netherlands they conclude that 
employer search is mostly non-sequential. Almost all applicants arrive during the first 
two weeks after the announcement of a vacancy. The rest of the duration of a vacancy 
is a selection period. 
  These results suggest, firstly, that resources spent on job advertising are 
concentrated to the beginning of the recruitment process. Hence these costs do not 
depend on the duration of the vacancy and should be treated as a hiring cost (as 
defined in the beginning of this section). 
  Secondly, suppose that company personnel spend c hours per week on screening 
and interviewing until the best applicant is found. In this case we would haveγ = c. 
But c cannot be interpreted as a given parameter, since after the pool of applicants has 
been formed, the employer knows the number of applicants and then also the number 
of hours needed for screening and interviewing. It is these costs which characterize 
the situation faced by the employer. The distribution of the costs between weeks is up 
to the employer. The employer may choose to concentrate all interviews to one week 
or, say, contact two applicants per week until all applicants who have passed the 
initial screening have been interviewed. The strategy chosen, and hence also the 
length of the selection period, should depend on how urgent it is to fill the vacancy. 
But the decision to begin recruiting in the first place only depends on the (expected) 
total number of hours needed for screening and interviewing. 
  The structure of recruitment costs also depends on the occurrence of unfilled 
jobs. Note that the opportunity cost of an unfilled job may be high. Vacancy costs 
may consequently be high if all vacancies are unfilled jobs. But this is exactly why 
firms try to avoid them. It follows that the number of unfilled jobs also depends on   9
firms’ possibility and ability to anticipate separations and recruitment times and 
reduce the risk for unfilled jobs by starting to recruit replacements early.  
  Moreover, since it may be too costly to eliminate all unfilled jobs with certainty, 
the existence of unfilled jobs also depends on what firms consider to be the optimal 
recruitment strategy and the associated (expected) number of unfilled jobs. In a model 
where unfilled jobs are generated endogenously, recruitment costs will consequently 
comprise not only the opportunity cost of the risk for unfilled jobs but also the cost of 
reducing this risk.  
   It may be possible to design models where unfilled jobs are generated 
endogenously, but so far this has not been done, and this is also outside the scope of 
the present paper. But note that what matters for firms’ decisions to start recruiting 
can only be expected recruitment costs for the optimal recruitment strategy, including 
the opportunity cost of the expected number of unfilled jobs. On the other hand, 
unfilled jobs can also arise as complete surprises (shocks). Then they cannot reduce 
employment and hirings through (expected) effects on recruitment costs. But they will 
nevertheless reduce employment, namely by creating gaps between firms’ 
employment plans and actual employment.  
 
3.4. Vacancies, employment, and hirings 
A firm stabilizes employment at its equilibrium level N by generating vacancies and 
hirings at the rate of sN per period, so that the stock of vacancies is  
(8)   Vs N q =  
in equilibrium. Equation (8) for a firm, or a group of firms, shows how vacancies 
adjust to variations in employment. It also shows that a change in q will change the 
number of vacancies. Employment and hirings are affected only if variation in the 
average duration of vacancies (1 ) affects employment by affecting recruitment 
costs.  
q
  Note finally that in equilibrium a firm’s number of hirings per period is 
proportional not only to its employment, Hs N = , as discussed above, but also to its 
separation rate. Focusing on the effects of recruitment costs on hirings through 
employment, we have so far assumed that the separation rate is constant. But even if a 
firm’s number of separations is increasing in its employment, it need not be strictly 
proportional. Moreover, the separation rate may depend on the state of the labour   10
market, as measured, for instance, by the unemployment rate or the degree of 
reallocation in the economy, and on structural factors, including, in particular, the 
share of temporary jobs, as emphasized, for instance, by Verhage et al. (1987 p. 17). 
 
4. Beveridge curves, matching functions, and duration functions 
In this section we review the Beveridge curve and the matching function and see how 
indirect evidence on vacancy durations from these functions can be replaced by direct 
evidence from the duration function.   
 
4.1. The Beveridge curve 
Since, in general, q (and perhaps also s) depends on unemployment (and perhaps also 
vacancies), equation (8) for a group of firms defines a relation between the vacancy 
rate (V ) and the unemployment rate in a labour market. This is the long-run 
Beveridge curve, which in a UV diagram connects UV points for which employment 
is constant. Note that its derivation here does not presuppose that all separations are to 
unemployment or that only unemployed people are hired. 
N
  In the literature on vacancies an outward shift of the Beveridge curve, or, 
equivalently, increased unemployment at a given vacancy rate, has been interpreted as 
an increase in ‘maladjustment’ in the labour market, beginning with Dow and Dicks-
Mireaux (1958), or as a decline in the ‘search effectiveness’ of the unemployed, as in 
Jackman, Layard, and Pissarides (1989) and Layard, Nickell, and Jackman (1991). 
But more vacancies at a given unemployment rate may also suggest a rise in job 
turnover or job reallocation, as emphasized by, for instance, Thomson (1966 p. 191), 
Abraham (1987 p. 230), Schager (1987 p. 33) and Blanchard and Diamond (1989).  
  More precisely, controlling for separations an outward shift of the Beveridge curve 
suggests a rise in the average duration of vacancies (1 ), according to (8). But with 
information on hirings as well as vacancies, indirect evidence on vacancy durations 
from Beveridge curves can be replaced by direct evidence. For, according to (2) we 
have 
q
1 , so that  qV H = V  is a direct measure of the average duration of 
vacancies, independent of labour turnover.  
H
 
4.2. The matching function   11
In the search and matching literature the relation between hirings, vacancies, and 
unemployment in a labour market has been interpreted as an aggregate production 
function, showing how vacancies and unemployment as inputs give rise to output in 
the form of hirings. This is also what equation (2) suggests.  
  In fact, equation (2) for a representative firm merely formalizes the idea that a 
firm in most cases (excluding instantaneous hirings) has to ‘do something’ (V) in 
order to recruit people. In other words, a hiring presupposes a job vacancy, that is, a 
recruitment process, and this recruitment process generates a hiring with some 
probability per week (q). It follows that at any given moment in time the number of 
hirings per period should be (roughly) proportional to the number of ongoing 
recruitment processes, as equation (2) tells us.  
  Moreover, introducing the plausible assumption that the average duration of 
vacancies (1 ) depends on the tightness of the labour market as measured by the 
ratio of vacancies to unemployment, 
q
( ) V U = qq , it follows from (2) and a log-linear 
approximation,  ( U V ) qc
α
= ,  that  
(9)   ( )
1 HV q V U c VU
α α − == . 
This suggests that a Cobb-Douglas specification with constant returns to scale should 
be successful in empirical work, as indeed it is.
5 
  It might be tempting to conclude that a shift of the matching function with less 
hirings at given inputs of vacancies and unemployment indicates a change of the 
matching technology which in itself reduces the number of hirings per period, and 
which consequently also reduces the arrival rate of job offers which face the 
unemployed and thus increases unemployment by prolonging unemployment spells. 
But this is a hasty conclusion. To see this, note first that a shift of the matching 
function is equivalent to a shift of the duration function  ( ) 1 V U = Tq , where 
TV H = . Of course a rise in T suggests fewer hirings per period – other things being 
equal. But other things will not be equal, as we have seen in Section 3. Longer 
vacancy spells will increase the stock of vacancies in equilibrium, so that hirings, 
employment and unemployment are stable – unless recruitment costs increase.  
   12
4.3. The duration function 
Since the number of vacancies is proportional to the number of hirings per period it is 
an often used indicator of changes in employment in the near future. But controlling 
for hirings the number of vacancies is also an indicator of how difficult it is to recruit 
personnel. More precisely, V/H is a measure of friction in terms of deviations from 
instantaneous hirings, since it equals the average duration of all vacancies, including 
‘vacancies with negligible duration’, like recalls by phone calls of former employees. 
Since ‘vacancies with negligible duration’ are not usually measured in vacancy 
surveys, it is perhaps more accurate to say that V/H equals the average duration of 
vacancies weighted with the proportion of non-instantaneous hirings.  
  Of course friction as measured by V/H in general depends on the state of the 
labour market. This dependence can be characterized by a duration function, where 
the independent variables include not only the unemployment rate but also, for 
instance, the share of long-term unemployment and the share of youth in the 
population. 
  Shifts of the vacancy duration function are equivalent to shifts of the matching 
function but easier to interpret. Longer vacancy spells may reduce employment by 
raising recruitment costs, as outlined in Section 3.  But longer recruitment times 
probably tend to reduce employment by increasing not only recruitment costs but also 
risks for unfilled jobs. For this reason V/H should be a useful general indicator of 
recruitment problems. 
  However, longer recruitment times do not necessarily reduce employment. Of 
course longer recruitment times may, if they are unanticipated, increase the risk of 
not succeeding in hiring new workers in time to replace separations or expand 
employment according to plan. But when a firm can anticipate its need for new hires, 
it can also reduce the risk for unmet demand by starting to recruit earlier. In other 
words, gaps between planned and actual employment as measured by the rate of 




                                                                                                                                            
5 See, in particular, the survey by Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001).    13
5. Conclusions  
According to the dynamic theory of labour demand the number of hirings per period 
chosen by a firm when hirings are instantaneous is in general determined by the 
firm’s desired net change of employment and its need to replace workers who, for 
various reasons, are leaving the firm. And the firm’s desired net change of 
employment depends on 1) current employment, 2) current sales, prices and costs 
(including recruitment costs), and 3) expectations of future sales, prices and costs, as 
elaborated, for instance, in Nickell (1986) or Hamermesh (1993). Thus, individual 
hirings, and hence also aggregate hirings, are functions of current and expected 
prices, sales and costs, including recruitment costs.   
  This hiring function for instantaneous hirings is modified by deviations from 
instantaneous hirings. The matching function is, of course, not intended to be a short 
cut to such a modified dynamic hiring function, not even in equilibrium. A reasonable 
first approximation to a dynamic hiring function for non-instantaneous hirings is 
obtained instead by substituting all recruitment costs for hiring costs in a dynamic 
hiring function. 
  The matching function, on the other hand, provides information on friction in 
job matching and the dependence of friction on the state of the labour market. To 
emphasize this role of the relation between vacancies (V), hirings (H), and 
unemployment (and other variables characterizing the state of the labour market), it 
should be specified as a relation with V/H as a dependent variable, since this is a 
summary measure of deviations from instantaneous hirings. Note, however, that 
longer recruitment times as measured by V/H do not indicate a negative effect of 
friction on employment unless corroborated by, for instance, an increasing rate of 
unfilled jobs.  
 
   14
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